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SOMMARIO. Questa ricerca analizza il segreto ministeriale come una 
categoria giuridica che protegge il sigillo confessionale nel diritto 
spagnolo. In precedenza, vengono studiati due aspetti della stessa 
questione, ovvero il aspetto confessionale (riservatezza della 
confessione) e il legale secolare (il segreto ministeriale). Per affrontare 
il primo, si sintetizzano storia e regolamenti nel diritto canonico. E per 
indagare sul secondo, il segreto ministeriale, verrano spiegati i valori 
legali alla base di questo fenomeno. Infine, verrà analizzata citicamente 
la regolamentazione legale del segreto ministeriale nel diritto spagnolo. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: secreto ministeriale, sigillo confessionale, diritto 
processuale, diritto penale, diritto canónico, Spagna. 
 
ABSTRACT: This research analyzes the religious communications 
privilege as a legal rule that protects the seal of confession in Spanish 
law. Two facets of the same issue are studied in preparation for this, 
namely the religious side (seal of confession) and the secular legal side 
(the religious communications privilege). To address the first, history 
and regulations in canon law are synthesized. To investigate the second, 
the religious communications privilege, the legal values underlying this 
phenomenon will be explained. Finally, the legal regulation of religious 
communications privilege in Spanish law will be critically analyzed. 
KEYWORDS: religious communications privilege, seal of confession, 
procedural law, criminal law, canon law, Spain. 
 
1. Introduction 
Secularization as a social phenomenon means at least three things: (i) 
religion is no longer relevant in the public sphere, so the foundation of 
political living-together is secular; (ii) institutional religious beliefs and 
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practice within a given population have decreased; (iii) religious beliefs 
are «another option» among different commodities in the free market of 
beliefs and ideas.1  
In this regard, state law is embodied in time and space, and cannot be 
dissociated from either that secularization or from its historical baggage.  
For this reason, when dealing with sensitive issues such as the seal of 
confession or the religious communications privilege, ethical and legal 
arguments come to light —for and against their protection—revealing a 
secularized mentality that may even influence specific aspects of 
individual and collective fundamental rights. 
Indeed, the seal of confession and the religious communications 
privilege enjoy constant and consolidated legal protection in Spanish 
law. However, this protected relationship has recently been involved in 
problems such as the abuse of minors by the Catholic clergy, and so the 
solidity of the long-standing legal protection may falter. 
The weakening of the religious communications privilege is 
understandable in a secularized context since the seal of confession (and 
the religious communications privilege in general) is scrutinized under 
utilitarian or consequentialist criteria according to which before an 
exception to the general rule (namely securing secrecy of religious 
communication) the legal protection of minors is always more important. 
If (theoretically) the disappearance of the abuse of minors could be 
attained breaking the protective rule of the religious communications 
privilege, then nothing, without exception, may legally support the 
maintenance of an institution from which (theoretically again) evil over 
good follows. 
The reasoning is simplistic but tremendously effective in Spanish 
media,2 where subtly but constantly the value of the legal protection of 
 
1 R. SERRANO, “Así erró Zaratustra”, Aceprensa, 2007 [accessed 02.01.2021], 
http://www.aceprensa.com/articles/asi-erro-zaratustra/. 
2 J. BASTANTE, “Secreto de confesión: ¿Bula para pederastas?”, Eldiario.es, 2018  
[accessed 02.07.2019], https://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Secreto-confesion-Bula-
pederastas_0_811219226.html; J. G. BEDOYA, “Los escándalos de pederastia desafían 
al secreto de confesión”, El País, 2018 [accessed 02.07.2019], 
https://elpais.com/sociedad/2018/09/09/actualidad/1536508658_743805.html; G. 
GASTAMINZA, “Un cura rechaza testificar en un caso que conoció en su función 
sacerdotal”, El País, 2002 [accessed 08.08.2019], 
https://elpais.com/diario/2002/07/19/sociedad/1027029605_850215.html; Y. 
MONTERO, “El fiscal solicita el archivo de la causa contra un cura que se negó a 
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religious secrecy has been undermined. Despite this, does this simplistic 
and effective reasoning yield a fair result, considering all the elements at 
stake? 
This research aims precisely to delve into those elements that condition 
both the debate and the fair result of the hypothetical conflict between 
the protection of ministerial secrecy and other paramount interests of 
individuals or of the state. To this aim, two facets of the same question 
are studied, namely, the religious side (the seal of confession) and the 
secular legal side (the religious communications privilege). By 
addressing the former, history and regulations in canon law are 
synthesized. To investigate the latter —ministerial secrecy— the legal 
values underlying this phenomenon and the legal regulation (current and 
future) of ministerial secrecy in Spanish law will be critically analyzed. 
I must anticipate that the study of the legal regulation of the religious 
communications privilege in Spanish law is practically reduced to 
several regulations (largely procedural and criminal), since Spanish 
courts have rarely ruled on this issue and so there is no significant case 
law to speak of. 
2. The religious communications privilege 
The religious communications privilege consists of the secrecy that the 
religious minister rightly keeps before governmental authorities 
concerning facts known by him due to his office or the peculiar service 
of a religious or spiritual nature. 
The religious communications privilege is an aspect of the legal regime 
of religious ministers. In Spanish law, a religious minister is «the 
individual who, in each religious denomination or group, performs 
functions of religious leadership or leads worship or religious service, 
regardless of his/her rank in the respective religious community. In 
 
testificar”, El País, 2003 [accessed 06.01.2021], 
https://elpais.com/diario/2003/03/18/sociedad/1047942004_850215.html; M. 
PLANELLES, “Un sacerdote recurre al secreto de confesión para evitar declarar en un 
juicio”, El País, 2014 [accessed 06.01.2021], 
https://elpais.com/ccaa/2014/02/26/andalucia/1393445771_925186.html; E. ROS, 
“Secreto de confesión o secreto inconfesable”, El País, 1995 [accessed 06.01.2021], 
https://elpais.com/diario/1995/03/06/ultima/794444401_850215.html; J. M. VIDAL, 
“Víctima de abusos: «Cuando hablamos, el sacerdote encubridor nos calumnió y hasta 





Spain, this terminology has also been accepted, to simplify the wording 
of the laws, by those religions that do not have worship in the proper 
sense of the word, such as Judaism or Islam. Within each religious group, 
each minister is designated according to its own regulations».3 
The salient features of ministerial secrecy could be described as follows. 
The individual who reveals does so to the extent that he/she is a member, 
believer, or follower of religious group and proceeds to communicate 
facts or actions to another as a means of worshipping, receiving advice, 
or spiritual relief. The depositary of the revelation keeps the confidential 
communication due to a particular qualification endowed by the religious 
group to which he/she belongs. The objective element (facts, actions, 
etc.) is impregnated with confidentiality and this appears to be an 
essential element of the relationship established, one that is characterized 
by secrecy. 
The religious communications privilege is understood here as an oral 
secret. However, it could well encompass documentary secrecy as well. 
Be that as it may, documentary secrecy offers specific features that 
deserve a different and more specific treatment. 
Often, startling cases appear in the media in which the ministerial secret 
is involved. We shall remember several of these cases. 
Christmas Eve, 1993. A 23-year-old young man knelt at the confessional 
of Father Paolo Turturro, in the Santa Lucia parish (Palermo, Italy) to 
repent and confess that he had participated on May 23, 1993, in the 
spectacular murder of the anti-mafia judge Giovanni Falcone, his wife, 
Judge Francesca Morvillo, and three bodyguards. The young penitent 
was only looking for forgiveness and peace of mind. Paolo Turturro —
one of the famous anti-mafia priests in Italy, later convicted of child 
abuse4— seems to have been unable to maintain the absolute secrecy of 
the confession: in the Christmas homily, he explained to his parishioners 
his recent experience in the confessional, leaving the penitent 
 
3 Cfr. A. MONTOYA MELGAR (ED.), Diccionario Jurídico de la Real Academia de 
Jurisprudencia y Legislación, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, Cizur Menor (Navarra), 
2016, p. 726. M. GONZÁLEZ SÁNCHEZ, Los ministros de culto en el ordenamiento 
jurídico español, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2003. 
4 S. PALAZZOLO, “La storia a due facce di don Turturro ‘Prego dopo la condanna’”, La 





anonymous, which would constitute indirect revelation. The news about 
that Christmas preaching spread quickly, causing bewilderment.5 
1996, Lane County (Oregon). The recording of the conversation held by 
Reverend Timothy Mockaitis with Conan Wayne Hale, a correctional 
inmate, was intended to be used as evidence in the criminal murder trial 
against said inmate. The Federal Court of Appeal, Ninth Circuit, heard 
the lawsuit brought by the priest and the bishop of the diocese against 
the use of the recording. The three magistrates of the court, among whom 
were Judge John Thomas Noonan, understood that the recording and 
seizure of the tape violated the free exercise of religion of Reverend 
Mockaitis. However, the Court did not order the destruction of the tape, 
as requested by the priest.6  
In 2001 a judgment of the High Court of Caen, in France, condemned 
the Bishop of Bayeux, Bishop Pican, for covering up a crime. Faced with 
the controversial issue, some observers have since stated that with this 
judicial ruling there was an undue restriction of the ministerial secrecy 
of Bishops and a break in the nexus of trust between them and their 
priests.7  
In the debate on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court, held in 1998 and 1999, a proposal led by Canada and 
France was rejected which sought not to recognize the right of ministers 
of religion to refrain from testifying in court on issues known through 
the seal of confession or confidences of their faithful.8 
 
5 A. ZINITI, “Preti contro Turturro 'dannoso esibizionismo'”, La Repubblica, 29 
decembre 1993 [accessed 01.08.2019], 
https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1993/12/29/preti-contro-
turturro-dannoso-esibizionismo.html. 
6 “Prosecutor Might Use Confession to a Priest”, The New York Times, May 13, 1996 
[accessed 26.01.2021], http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/13/us/prosecutor-might-use-
confession-to-a-priest.html; The Reverend Timothy Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 
1522 (9th Cir. 1997); T. J. MOCKAITIS, The seal: a priest’s story, Xlibris, Philadelphia, 
PA, 2008. 
7 “Justice: Mgr. Pierre Pican a justifié sa décision de ne pas faire appel de sa 
condamnation”, Le Monde, 9 septembre 2001 [accessed 26.01.2021], 
https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/2001/09/09/justice-mgr-pierre-pican-a-
justifie-sa-decision-de-ne-pas-faire-appel-de-sa-
condamnation_4195441_1819218.html; “Pierre Pican”, Wikipédia [accessed 
26.01.2021], https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Pican. 
8 R. J. ARAUJO, “International Tribunals and Rules of Evidence: The Case for 
Respecting and Preserving the «Priest-Penitent» Privilege Under International Law”, 
American University International Law Review, vol. 15, 3, 2000. 
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These episodes, in which it is intended to protect religious secrecy 
against secular interference, contrast with other examples in which a 
minister of religion intends to break their duty of confidentiality in 
reporting illicit deeds to state authorities. This was indeed the case in 
Argentina in 2017 when a Mormon bishop denounced a rapist to prevent 
further abuse occurring.9 This situates us before a legal evolution, 
without which it is difficult to understand the religious communications 
privilege. 
This legal evolution may be described as follows. The religious 
communications privilege arose in Western legal systems either as a 
transposition of a canon law duty or as a specific manifestation of the 
religious freedom of certain Christian groups. Afterwards, the religious 
communications privilege was «secularized» by being assimilated within 
the professional secrets of doctors or lawyers, extending it to all ministers 
of religion, and becoming an entitlement or even a general obligation.10 
Finally, what was seemingly a protective element in favor of religious 
denominations and groups was contested by those religious ministers in 
whose groups there was no specific obligation of secrecy whatsoever but, 
on the contrary, the obligation to reveal to governmental authorities was 
the religiously enforceable conduct.11 
As indicated, the «secularization» of the religious communications 
privilege meant its assimilation within professional communication 
privileges. Consequently, it might be assumed that the legal features of 
these professional privileges and the religious communications privilege 
are the same. However, there are important distinctions concerning their 
rationale and limits. 
 
9 “Un obispo mormón rompió el secreto de confesión para denunciar a un violador”, La 
Nación, 26 abril 2017 [accessed 26.01.2021], 
https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/un-obispo-mormon-rompio-el-secreto-de-
confesion-para-denunciar-a-un-violador-nid2017686/. 
10 J.-L. BAUDOUIN, Secret professionel et droit au secret dans le droit de la preuve: 
étude de droit québecois comparé au droit français et à la common-law, Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1965. 
11 M. BROYDE; Y. REISS; N. DIAMENT, “Confidentiality and Rabbinic Counseling - An 
Overview of Halakhic and Legal Issues”, Jewish Law Articles [accessed 26.01.2021], 
http://jlaw.com/Articles/RabbinicCounseling1.html; A. AL-HIBRI, “The Muslim 
Perspective on the Clergy-Penitent Privilege Symposium: Executing the Wrong Person: 
The Professionals’ Ethical Dilemmas”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 4, 1995; A. 
M. SOKOBIN, “Rabbinic Confidentiality: American Law and Jewish Law”, University 
of Toledo Law Review, 4, 2006. 
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As to the rationale, the series of protected rights or interests is not the 
same in all the so-called professional secrets. In the case of 
communications to doctors and lawyers, the right of privacy of the 
patient or client, the deontological requirements, and the proper 
development of the professional relationship come together. 
Communications to journalists «should not be confused with the generic 
professional secrecy of doctors, lawyers, etc., since they do not share the 
same legal nature, nor content, nor do they protect the same legal right, 
nor can their ownership be predicated from the same individuals. Thus, 
while generic professional secrecy is configured as a legal duty to keep 
secret data that has become known through the exercise of a specific 
profession, the journalists' privilege is configured as a fundamental right 
not to reveal information sources. The legal interest protected in the 
former is privacy, while in the latter is the right to information and, 
therefore, the creation of a free public opinion».12 Finally, in the case of 
the religious communications privilege, the scheme of interests and 
rights at stake is thrice radically modulated by religious freedom. First, 
the religious freedom of the faithful or believer to be able to practice acts 
of worship according to the rules of his own religious community. 
Second, the religious freedom of the minister of religion to comply with 
the disciplinary duty that obliges him to remain silent. And third, the 
religious freedom of the church, religious community, or group to 
establish and observe norms regulating its rites and worship (usually 
called autonomy of religious groups). 
Regarding the limits, it is vital to note that clergy-penitent secrecy is 
absolute in many cases. This is to say that, once the conditions 
established by the legal system have been met to identify the religious 
communications privilege (to ensure its external recognition), there are 
no intrinsic limits that may prevail over it. Nevertheless, in some legal 
systems extrinsic limits might exist as the waiver of the penitent,13 the 
minister of religion’s duty to report or to testify in cases involving the 
abuse of minors,14 and the report of future crimes.15 By contrast, in other 
 
12 S. SÁNCHEZ GONZÁLEZ Y OTROS, Dogmática y práctica de los derechos 
fundamentales, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2006, pp. 293-294. 
13 W. COLE DURHAM, R. SMITH, “§ 20:9. The clergy-penitent privilege”, Religious 
Organizations and the Law, Westlaw, 2020. 
14 R. PALOMINO LOZANO, “Sigilo de confesión y abuso de menores”, Ius Canonicum, 
vol. 59, 118, 2019. 
15 Australia, Evidence Act 1995, Section 127 Religious confessions. (1) A person who 
is or was a member of the clergy of any church or religious denomination is entitled to 
refuse to divulge that a religious confession was made, or the contents of a religious 
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professions or «status» there are recognized intrinsic and extrinsic 
exceptions to the duty of secrecy; for officials or public servants, the 
notorious and public knowledge, and facts in process of notoriety.16 For 
liberal professions, this is the conscious or unconscious concealment of 
pieces of evidence or illegal objects, the facts in which client and 
professional have a common interest (as partners, accomplices, etc.),17 
future illicit facts, and fee disputes.18 For doctors, this is in particular the 
state of health as a contested issue in civil or criminal proceedings.19 
In the next section, the features, nature, and value of the seal of 
confession are exposed, which in my view are at the origin of the 
religious communications privilege. 
3. The sigillum confessionis 
The seal of confession is «a particular kind of secret that obliges the 
confessor to never reveal, for any reason and without exception, the 
penitent or the sins the penitent has revealed in the sacrament of 
penance».20 
Can. 959 CIC establishes: «In the sacrament of penance the faithful who 
confess their sins to a legitimate minister, are sorry for them, and intend 
to reform themselves obtain from God through the absolution imparted 
by the same minister forgiveness for the sins they have committed after 
baptism and, at the same time, are reconciled with the Church which they 
have wounded by sinning». 
3.1. Historical features 
Throughout history, the sacrament of penance has been characterized by 
the seal of secrecy that obliges the confessor. The first salient reference 
to the obligation of secrecy is found in a letter from Pope Leo the Great 
in 459 to the bishops of Campania, Somnio, and Piceno, in which he 
 
confession made, to the person when a member of the clergy. (2) Subsection (1) does 
not apply if the communication involved in the religious confession was made for a 
criminal purpose. 
16 R. GARCÍA MACHO, Secreto profesional y libertad de expresión del funcionario, 
Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia (1994), pp. 26 ff. 
17 M.N. HOWARD, P. CRANE, D.A. HOCHBERG, Phipson on Evidence (14th ed.), Sweet 
& Maxweel, Londres, 1990, pp. 513 ff.  
18 A. BEST, Evidence: examples and explanations, Little, Brown, Boston, 1994, p. 175. 
19 A. BEST, Evidence: examples and explanations, p. 183. 
20 D. CITO, “Sigilo sacramental”, in Diccionario General de Derecho Canónico, vol. 
VII, Aranzadi, Cizur Menor (Navarra), 2012, p. 307. 
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condemns the practice of divulging confessed sins.21 The violation of the 
secrecy was set up as illicit conduct in the Capitularia of Charlemagne.22 
Even in the 9th century, at the local level, a clear reference to the secret 
of confession is made in the Council of Douzy (874).23 The Capitula 
Rodolphi established that when the confession is spontaneous and the 
crime is hidden, the penance imposed must not be public, so that the 
other faithful do not harbor suspicions when they see that a serious 
penance is imposed for something they are not aware of. A similar 
measure is provided in the Constitutions of Bishop Richard Poore 
(Salisbury Synod, 1217-1219), prescribing not to impose on a woman 
such a penance that makes her suspect in the eyes of her husband.24 
The Poenitentiale Summorum Pontificum, around the 10th century, 
repeated the condemnatory statement of banishment already established 
in the Poenitentiale Cassinense.25 This serious penalty also appeared in 
the Concordia Discordantium Canonum by Master Gratian.26 The basic 
 
21 De poenitentia scilicet quae ita a fidelibus postulatur, ne de singulorum peccatorum 
genere libellis scripta professio publice recitetur, conscientiarum sufficiat solis 
sacerdotibus indicari confessionum secreta. Quamvis enim plenitudo fidei videatur 
esse laudabilis, quae propter Dei timorem apud omnes erubescere non veretur, tamen 
quia non omnium huiusmodi sunt peccata, ut ea, qui poenitentiam poscunt, non timeant 
publicare, removeatur tamen improbabilis consuetudo, ne multi a poenitentiae 
remediis arceantur, dum aut erubescunt aut metuunt inimicis suis sua facta reserare, 
quibus possint legum constitutione percelli. Sufficit enim illa confessio, quae primum 
Deo offertur, tunc etiam sacerdoti, qui pro delictis poenitentium precator accedit. Tunc 
enim plures ad poenitentiam poterint provocari, si populi auribus non publicetur 
conscientia confitentis. Leo I Pp, Epistula 168. Ad Episcopos per Campaniam, 
Samnium et Picenum constitutos, Mansi 6, 410-411. 
22 Ut t hoc inquiratur, si de partibus Austriae verum est quod dicunt an non, quod 
presbiteri de confessionibus accepto pretio manifestent latrones. MGH - 2 Leges. 2 
Capitul 01. Capitularia Regum Francorum [1925-1933] 175. 
23 R. P. STAKE, «Grounding the "Priest-Penitent Privilege" in American Law», in 
Confidentiality in the United States. - A Legal and Canonical Study, Canon Law Society 
of America ed., Washington D.C., 1988, p. 149. 
24 J. M. GONZÁLEZ DEL VALLE, El sacramento de la penitencia. Fundamentos 
históricos de su regulación actual, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1972, p. 210. 
25 P. Cassinense XII,17. Si quis sacerdos palam fecerit et secretum penitentiae 
usurpauerit et quauis homo intellexerit, et declaratum fuerit quem celare debuerit, ab 
omni honore suo in cunctum populum deponatur et diebus uitae suae peregrinando 
finiat. A. H. GAASTRA, Between Liturgy and Canon Law. A Study of Books of 
Confession and Penance (doctoral dissertation), Universiteit Utrecht, Utrecht, 2007, 
pp. 15-16 [accessed 29.07.2019], 
https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/23216/full.pdf?sequence=11&isAll
owed=y. 
26 Sacerdos ante omnia caueat, ne de his, qui ei confitentur peccata sua, recitet alicui 
quod ea confessus est non propinquis, non extraneis, neque, quod absit, pro aliquo 
10 
 
elements of the text eventually passed from Gratian to the Synod of Paris 
(1203), and from there to the IV Lateran Council (1215) in whose canon 
21, in a universal and undoubted manner, was established the content, 
scope, and gravity of the seal of confession:27 «Let the priest be discreet 
and cautious (…) let him exercise the greatest precaution that he does 
not in any degree by word, sign, or any other manner make known the 
sinner, but should he need more prudent counsel, let him seek it 
cautiously without any mention of the person. He who dares to reveal a 
sin confided to him in the tribunal of penance, we decree that he be not 
only deposed from the sacerdotal office but also relegated to a monastery 
of strict observance to do penance for the remainder of his life».28 The 
Decretals of Gregory IX or Liber extra contain a similar text, establishing 
the removal of the priest and perpetual penance in seclusion.29  
Subsequently, the maintenance of the obligation of secrecy as an inherent 
element to the confession is steadfast, which is thrice reflected in the 
1917 Code: (1) regulation of the seal of confession, chance knowledge, 
 
scandalo. Nam si hoc fecerit, deponatur, et omnibus diebus uitae suae ignominiosus 
peregrinando pergat. Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. Friedberg, Lipsia, 1879, vol. 1, 
Decretum Magistri Gratiani, Pars II, C. 33, q. 3, c. 2. 
27 D. TARANTINO, “Confesión y sigilo sacramental en el Concilio Lateranense IV: de la 
normativa a la reflexión doctrinal”, Vergentis, vol. 1, 3, 2016. 
28 H. J. D. DENZINGER, Enchiridion symbolorum et definitionum: quae de rebus fidei et 
morum a conciliis oecumenicis et summis pontificibus emanarunt, Sumptibus 
Stahelianis, 1854, n. 363. 
29 (…) qui peccatum in poenitentiali indicio sibi detectum praesumpserit revelare, non 
solum a sacerdotali officio deponendum decernimus, verum etiam ad agendam 




and acquired knowledge;30 (2) protection of secrecy from procedural 
discovery rules;31 and (3) crime of violation of the seal of confession.32 
3.2. Current regulations 
The Code of Canon Law of 1983 renews the legal protection of the seal 
of confession33 extending it to the so-called acquired knowledge.34 The 
new norm of can. 983 distinguishes between the duty of secrecy (which 
affects people other than the priest who may be aware of the content of 
the confession) and the seal of confession (which only affects the priest 
to whom the confession was made to obtain absolution even if it could 
be denied). There is no duty of secrecy, however, regarding simulated or 
feigned confessions. Experts also distinguish between the essential 
elements of the seal (manifested venial and mortal sins, circumstances 
 
30 C. 889 §1. Sacramentale sigillum inviolabile est; quare caveat diligenter 
confessarius ne verbo aut signo aut alio quovis modo et quavis de causa prodat 
aliquatenus peccatorem. §2. Obligatione servandi sacramentale sigillum tenentur 
quoque interpres aliique omnes ad quos notitia confessionis quoquo modo pervenerit.  
 C. 890 §1. Omnino prohibitus est confessario usus scientiae ex confessione 
acquisitae cum gravamine poenitentis, excluso etiam quovis revelationis periculo. §2. 
Tam Superiores pro tempore exsistentes, quam confessarii qui postea Superiores 
fuerint renuntiati, notitia quam de peccatis in confessione habuerint, ad exteriorem 
gubernationem nullo modo uti possunt. 
31 C. 1755 §1. Testes iudici legitime interroganti respondere et veritatem fateri debent. 
§2. Salvo praescripto can. 1757, §3, n. 2, ab hac obligatione eximuntur: 1º Parochi 
aliique sacerdotes quod attinet ad ea quae ipsis manifestata sunt ratione sacri 
ministerii extra sacramentalem confessionem; civitatum magistratus, medici, 
obstetrices, advocati, notarii aliique qui ad secretum officii etiam ratione praestiti 
consilii tenentur, quod attinet ad negotia huic secreto obnoxia (…) 
 C. 1757 §1. Ut non idonei repelluntur a testimonio ferendo impuberes et mente 
debiles. (…) §3. Ut incapaces: (…) 2º Sacerdotes, quod attinet ad ea omnia quae ipsis 
ex confessione sacramentali innotuerunt, etsi a vinculo sigilli soluti sint; imo audita a 
quovis et quoquo modo occasione confessionis ne ut indicium quidem veritatis recipi 
possunt. 
32 C. 2369 §1. Confessarium, qui sigillum sacramentale directe violare praesumpserit, 
manet excommunicatio specialissimo modo Sedi Apostolicae reservata; qui vero 
indirecte tantum, obnoxius est poenis, de quibus in c. 2368, §1. §2. Quicunque 
praescriptum can. 889, §2 temere violaverit, pro reatus gravitate plectatur salutari 
poena, quae potest esse etiam excommunicatio. 
33 Can. 983 § 1. Sacramentale sigillum inviolabile est; quare nefas est confessario 
verbis vel alio quovis et quavis modo de causa aliquatenus prodere paenitentem. § 2. 
Obligatione secretum servandi tenentur quoque interpres, si detur, necnon omnes alii 
ad quos ex confessione notitia peccatorum quoquo modo pervenerit. 
34 Can. 984 § 1. Omnino confessario prohibetur scientiae ex confessione acquisitae 
usus cum paenitentis gravamine, etiam quovis revelationis periculo excluso. § 2. Qui 
in auctoritate est constitutus, notitia quam de peccatis in confessione quovis tempore 
excepta habuerit, ad exteriorem gubernationem nullo modo uti potest. 
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that could contribute to the identification of the penitent, identity and sins 
of the accomplices, denial of absolution, imposed penance...) from the 
accidental object (attitude of the penitent, form of confession…). The 
strict obligation of secrecy falls on the former.35 
Criminal protection of secrecy is established in can. 1388.36 This canon 
distinguishes between the direct violation of the seal (penalized by the 
excommunication latae sententiae reserved for the Holy See37); indirect 
violation of the seal (sanctioned with mandatory indeterminate 
excommunication ferendae sententiae); and violation of the obligation 
of secrecy (sanctioned with a mandatory indeterminate ferendae 
sententiae penalty that may reach the maximum censure).38 Similarly, 
current canon law punishes the recording by any technical means or 
malicious disclosure in the media of the things said by the priest or by 
the penitent in the true or feigned sacramental confession.39 
Consistently with this criminal protection, canon law excludes the 
confessor from testimony, even when the penitent asks for his 
statement.40 
 
35 D. CITO, “Sigilo sacramental”, p. 308. 
36 Can.1388 § 1. Confessarius, qui sacramentale sigillum directe violat, in 
excommunicationem latae sententiae Sedi Apostolicae reservatam incurrit; qui vero 
indirecte tantum, pro delicti gravitate puniatur. § 2. Interpres aliique, de quibus in can. 
983, § 2, qui secretum violant, iusta poena puniantur, non exclusa excommunicatione. 
37 CONGREGATIO PRO DOCTRINA FIDEI, “Rescriptum ex Audientia”, XXI Maii 2010, 
AAS 102 (2010) 419-43. Art. 4. 
38 «Existe violación directa cuando el confesor revela formalmente o, en un modo 
equivalente junto con la indicación de la persona aquello que constituye el objeto del 
sigilo sacramental. En cambio, es indirecta cuando a través de palabras o acciones que 
tienen otra finalidad, se pone en peligro de revelar lo que es la materia del sigilo. Esto 
puede ocurrir tanto cuando se habla de la materia sin nombrar a la persona como al 
hablar de la persona sin mención de la materia pero con el peligro de revelación o de 
inducción a la sospecha, dado que para que se produzca violación no es necesario que 
los destinatarios de la manifestación conozcan personalmente al penitente, e incluso 
podrían ignorar que lo revelado por el sacerdote haya sido conocido por él, en 
confesión.» D. CITO, “Sigilo sacramental”, p. 309. 
39 CONGREGATIO PRO DOCTRINA FIDEI, “Rescriptum ex Audientia”, XXI Maii 2010, 
AAS 102 (2010) 419-43. Art. 4.4º. 
40 Can. 1548 § 1. Testes iudici legitime interroganti veritatem fateri debent. § 2. Salvo 
praescripto can. 1550, § 2, n. 2, ab obligatione respondendi eximuntur: 1 clerici, quod 
attinet ad ea quae ipsis manifestata sunt ratione sacri ministerii (…) 
 Can. 1550 § 1. Ne admittantur ad testimonium ferendum minores infra decimum 
quartum aetatis annum et mente debiles; audiri tamen poterunt ex decreto iudicis, quo 
id expedire declaretur. § 2. Incapaces habentur: 1 qui partes sunt in causa, aut partium 
nomine in iudicio consistunt, iudex eiusve assistentes, advocatus aliique qui partibus 
in eadem causa assistunt vel astiterunt; 2 sacerdotes, quod attinet ad ea omnia quae 
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Crimes related to the sexual abuse of minors have led to an 
unprecedented canonical legal development to tackle this abhorrent 
problem.41 However, this move has not implied a weakening of the 
confidentiality feature of the sacrament of penance.  
The Motu proprio «Vos estis lux mundi» was intended to facilitate the 
complaint and avoid the obstruction of investigation reports relating to 
crimes of sexual abuse and child pornography. Article 3 of this Motu 
Propio exempts priests from the duty to report concerning what has been 
manifested to them in the exercise of their sacred ministry.42 Shortly after 
this pontifical norm was published, more specifically on June 29, 2019, 
the Apostolic Penitentiary issued a Note about the importance of the 
internal forum and the inviolability of the seal of confession.43 For our 
purposes here, three basic ideas in the Note may be highlighted. First, 
the inviolability of the seal of confession comes from divine law and is 
rooted in the very nature of the sacrament to the point of admitting no 
exceptions either in the ecclesial or in the civil spheres. Second, the 
absolute prohibition imposed by the sacramental seal is intended to 
prevent the priest from making the content of the confession known 
outside the sacrament; secrecy goes beyond the penitent's will; the 
 
ipsis ex confessione sacramentali innotuerunt, etsi poenitens eorum manifestationem 
petierit; immo audita a quovis et quoquo modo occasione confessionis, ne ut indicium 
quidem veritatis recipi possunt. 
41 Among others, F. R. AZNAR GIL, “El delito contra el sexto mandamiento del decálogo 
cometido por un clérigo con un menor de edad”, Revista Española de Derecho 
Canónico, vol. 70, 175, 2013; J. BERNAL, “Cuestiones canónicas sobre los delitos más 
graves contra el sexto mandamiento del Decálogo”, Ius Canonicum, vol. 54, 107, 2014; 
Á. LÓPEZ-SIDRO LÓPEZ, “La responsabilidad penal del clero en casos de abusos: una 
aproximación a la cuestión en Australia, Chile y Estados Unidos”, Revista General de 
Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. 50, 2019; D. MILANI, “Los 
abusos del clero. El proceso de reforma de una Iglesia en crisis”, Revista General de 
Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. 50, 2019; G. NÚÑEZ, 
“Abusos sexuales de menores. Consideraciones sobre el derecho de defensa y la 
colaboración con la autoridad civil”, Scripta Theologica, vol. 46, 2014; G. NÚÑEZ 
GONZÁLEZ, “Nueva regulación para la protección de menores y personas vulnerables 
en el Estado de la Ciudad del Vaticano”, Ius Canonicum, vol. 59, 117, 2019. 
42 PAPA FRANCISCO, Motu proprio «Vos estis lux mundi», 7 May 2019, Art. 3. 
43 APOSTOLIC PENITENTIARY, «Note of the Apostolic Penitentiary on the Importance of 
the Internal Forum and the Inviolability of the Sacramental Seal», 21 June 2019 
[accessed 29.01.2021], 
https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/tribunals/apost_penit/documents/rc_trib_appen_
pro_20190629_forointerno_sp.html. The Note is the subject of the interview to Card. 
Mauro Piacenza “Penitenciaría Apostólica: fuero interno e inviolabilidad del sigilo 





penitent, once the sacrament is celebrated, does not have the power to 
release the confessor from the duty of secrecy, because this duty comes 
directly from God. And third, secret communications, as well as so-
called «professional secrets», differ from those of the internal, 
sacramental, and extra-sacramental forums. 
3.3. Nature and limits of the seal of confession 
The Note from the Apostolic Penitentiary invites us to reflect on the 
foundations of the seal of confession. For this purpose, natural law 
grounds may be taken into consideration: the good reputation of the 
faithful, the freedom of the Church in the development of its spiritual 
mission before the possible invasion of political power, consistent 
protection for a relationship analogous to that of certain professions 
(medical, legal), and so forth.44  
However, the Note itself places us on the ground of the revealed divine 
law, which connects with the argument of Thomas Aquinas.45 Aquinas 
affirms that the confession by which an individual submits to the priest 
is a sign of the interior confession by which that individual submits to 
God. But God, explains Aquinas, conceals the sin of the man who 
humbles himself through penance: it is fitting for this to be signified in 
this sacrament. For this reason, the sacrament —he continues— imposes 
the obligation of secrecy and whoever misses this secret misses the 
sacrament. Secrecy is also justified by the fact that the faithful move 
more easily to confess their sins and manifest them with simplicity if 
there is secrecy. It is not true —writes the Angelic Doctor— that the seal 
of confession is against charity, since charity does not require any to 
remedy an unknown sin and what is known under the seal of confession 
is as if it were ignored, even though it is known as representative of God, 
yet is unknown as a private person. However —he adds— in such cases 
the possible remedy to sin must be sought without revealing the 
confession; for example, by admonishing the penitents, ensuring that 
others do not follow the bad example or advising the prelate that he must 
monitor their faithful more diligently, but in a manner that neither by his 
words nor by his conduct the confessor gives occasion to discover the 
penitent. Just as the precept of confession cannot be altered by man, 
secrecy cannot be dispensed by any human authority. No one, he goes so 
 
44 R. T. KENNEDY, State protection of confessional secrecy in the United States of 
America, Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, Romae, 1975, pp. 3-15. 
45 TOMÁS DE AQUINO, Summa Theologiae, Suppl. Q. 11 aa. 1-5. 
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far as to affirm, is cited as a witness except as a man; for the same reason 
he can swear without damage to his conscience that he is ignorant of 
what he knows only as a minister of God. Aquinas also indicates that 
when justice is in danger, what was heard in confession should not be 
revealed if it is also known otherwise, avoiding scandal as much as 
possible. In short, Thomas Aquinas links the seal to the very divine 
nature of the sacrament. From there derives both the mandatory nature 
of secrecy and its unavailability and non-derogability, even in extreme 
cases. 
In reconsidering the argumentation of the Note of the Apostolic 
Penitentiary, it should be noted that the seal is not only a guarantee of 
the normal development of an act of worship, but is also part of the «very 
nature of the sacrament»; that is why the Church «declares» it (positive 
divine law), not «establishes» it (ecclesiastical or canonical-positive 
law).46 Objectively, the seal is an intrinsic characteristic of one of the 
sacraments of the Catholic Church. Consequently and subjectively, it is 
the confessor's duty to keep a full reservation of what has been heard.47 
Comparing it with the instrumental nature of secrecy in other canonical 
relationships and institutions (making the ius connubii effective through 
secret marriage, can. 1131; protecting professional or family 
relationships in the canonical procedure, can. 1548 §2; guaranteeing 
independence in the appointment of bishops, can. 377 §2; preserving 
charity concerning the privacy of individuals, can. 645 §4), the seal of 
confession not only protects concomitant and concurrent legal rights but 
also identifies the sacred character of the penance itself. 
Canon lawyers have indeed tried to decide whether the secrecy of 
confession could be suspended under certain conditions. It has been 
sustained that if the penitent releases the confessor from the duty of 
secrecy, the confessor is exempted48; or that the extra-sacramental 
 
46 «Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae», n. 1467. Perspectis sanctimonia et magnitudine 
huius ministerii et observantia personis debita, Ecclesia declarat omnes sacerdotes qui 
confessiones audiunt, obligatos esse ad secretum absolutum relate ad peccata quae 
eorum poenitentes illis sint confessi, sub poenis severissimis. Neque possunt usum 
facere cognitionum quas illis confessio praebuerit circa poenitentium vitam. Hoc 
secretum, quod exceptiones non admittit, «sigillum sacramentale» appellatur, quia id 
quod poenitens sacerdoti manifestavit, manet a sacramento «sigillatum». 
47 R. PALOMINO LOZANO, “Secreto”, in Diccionario General de Derecho Canónico, 
vol. VII, Aranzadi, Cizur Menor (Navarra), 2012, pp. 173-174. 
48 G. J. ZUBACZ, The sacramental seal of confession from the Canadian civil law 
perspective (doctoral dissertation), Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada, 2008, pp. 
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private conversation with the priest in which the penitent repeats 
everything said within the confession situates the content in a different 
context in which the obligation disappears.49 However, taking into 
account the intrinsic link of the seal with the sacrament (not of the sigil 
with the penitent's privacy, as might be deduced from can. 983 «quare 
nefas est […] prodere paenitentem» or from can. 984 «cum paenitentis 
gravamine») it must be concluded that the penitent cannot dispense the 
confessor from their stringent duty.50 
Be that as it may, even if it is considered lawful for the priest to testify 
in a civil trial at the request of the penitent, this leaves intact —in my 
opinion— the moral entitlement of the confessor to refrain from 
testifying if he conscientiously considers that he cannot do it due to the 
damage to the sacrament it may cause, or to any harm to third parties that 
his action may provoke. 
4. Fundamental rights and legal interests at stake 
Once we have had the opportunity to summarize the concept, history, 
and nature of the seal of confession, it is time to explore the legal interests 
and fundamental rights that come into play in the regulation or legal 
modeling of the religious communications privilege, a right that 
encompasses a spectrum of communications of a religious nature —the 
seal of confession among them. 
The religious communications privilege is an exception to a general 
principle. This principle associates justice with the truth. Governments 
and their authorities seek, for the common good, to identify the truth of 
the facts to do justice and to allocate rights and obligations, sanctions, or 
benefits. Consequently, the disclosure and knowledge of the truth are 
crucial, both in civil and criminal proceedings, as well as in police or 
administrative investigations. To this aim, the law establishes the duty to 
denounce or report to the authorities in their investigations, or to testify 
 
68-69 [accessed 04.07.2019] 
https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/29803/1/NR52340.PDF. 
49 G. J. ZUBACZ, The sacramental seal of confession from the Canadian civil law 
perspective, pp. 81-82. 
50 D. CITO, “Sigilo sacramental”, p. 308. It is important to underline this because secular 
law experts may hold that if the penitent asks the confessor to testify, there is no harm 
to the penitent and there would be no violation of secrecy.  C. DONZE, “Breaking the 
Seal of Confession: Examining the Constitutionality of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege in 
Mandatory Reporting Law”, Louisiana Law Review, vol. 78, 1, 2018, p. 306. 
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the truth before the courts of justice.51 This duty appears in different 
specific norms and rules, such as those that oblige the witness to tell the 
truth,52 to answer all relevant cross-examination questions,53 or to report 
possible crimes, past or future, of which someone is aware.54 
However, justice may demand exceptions to honor other interests, 
principles, or rights that differ from the search for the truth. Some of 
these interests lie in the judicial system itself (concerning the 
professional secrecy that links lawyer and client). Others are based on 
social values of special esteem (the deontology of certain professions or 
their normal development, as is the case of the health professions). And, 
finally, others are requirements of fundamental rights and freedoms, such 
as the fundamental right to personal and family privacy (the exemption 
from the duty to testify or report family members) or the fundamental 
right to religious freedom (the religious communications privilege). 
As it is easy to conclude, the right to privacy and the right to religious 
freedom simultaneously converge in ministerial secrecy. Confidentiality 
protects privacy and at the same time facilitates the normal development 
of the relationship. Without confidentiality, the relationship could hardly 
develop in the expected atmosphere and could scarcely fulfil its purpose. 
Legal protection of ministerial secrecy based on the right to privacy 
protects mainly the faithful or penitent, not the minister of religion. 
Consequently, the former may lift the duty of secrecy, and the latter may 
find himself in the position from which the general principle starts, which 
 
51 «One of the primary aims of the adversarial trial process is to find the truth and all 
relevant information is, therefore, presumptively admissible». R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 
S.C.R. 263, J. ST. - MICHEL, “La Cour suprême du Canada a-t-elle aboli le secret de la 
confession?”, Ius Ecclesiae, vol. V, no. 1 (1993), p. 424. 
52 Ley de Enjuiciamiento civil española, Artículo 365. 1. Antes de declarar, cada testigo 
prestará juramento o promesa de decir verdad, con la conminación de las penas 
establecidas para el delito de falso testimonio en causa civil, de las que le instruirá el 
tribunal si manifestare ignorarlas; Codice de Procedura Penale Artícolo 198. 1. Il 
testimone ha l'obbligo di presentarsi al giudice e di attenersi alle prescrizioni date dal 
medesimo per le esigenze processuali e di rispondere secondo verità alle domande che 
gli sono rivolte”. 
53 M.N. HOWARD, P. CRANE, D. HOCHBERG, Phipson on evidence, 14th ed., Sweet & 
Maxswell, London, 1990, p. 242. 
54 Ley de Enjuiciamiento criminal española, Artículo 262. Los que por razón de sus 
cargos, profesiones u oficios tuvieren noticia de algún delito público, estarán obligados 
a denunciarlo inmediatamente al Ministerio fiscal, al Tribunal competente, al Juez de 
instrucción y, en su defecto, al municipal o al funcionario de policía más próximo al 
sitio, si se tratare de un delito flagrante. Los que no cumpliesen esta obligación 
incurrirán en la multa señalada en el artículo 259, que se impondrá disciplinariamente. 
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is not to keep silent but to reveal the truth. This final result is not 
unthinkable taking into account the legal configuration of the matter in 
countries of the Anglo-American legal tradition.55 
As pointed out earlier, religious freedom also converges in the religious 
communications privilege, shaping its foundation in full. We have 
considered religious freedom as a specific foundation of the religious 
communications privilege before, but a more nuanced exposition is 
subsequently detailed. 
Let us remember, first of all, that freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion includes the right to manifest, either alone or in a community 
with others, and in public or private, religion or beliefs through teaching, 
worship, and observance (this is recognized by article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948). Justifying the protection of 
ministerial secrecy on this fundamental right is not only possible but 
remains consistent. Indeed, to observe religious freedom fully and 
satisfactorily, respecting the specific patterns of religious practice and 
observance is needed. In the case of the sacrament of penance, secrecy 
is an essential characteristic. If the confidential religious communication 
would be compulsorily broken before the authorities of the state or 
before the courts of justice, then it is apparent that laws that command 
such violation would become a serious obstacle (if not an open 
infringement) of the free practice of religion. Furthermore, if ministerial 
secrecy were not recognized in the secular sphere, then it would be a 
deterrent of the adherence of believers to their religion and, ultimately, a 
negative effect on certain religious groups. 
It is also interesting to note, secondly, that in the hypothetical conflict 
between the duty of the minister of religion to appear in court and testify, 
on the one hand, and the duty to remain silent (as prescribed by religious 
law) on the other, we find the typical dilemma of religious conscientious 
objection,56 which is considered a phenomenon worthy of careful 
consideration. 
 
55 DONNA KRIER IOPPOLO, “Civil Law and Confidentiality”, Confidentiality in the 
United States.- A Legal and Canonical Study, Canon Law Society of America, 
Washington D.C., 1988, p. 31-32. 
56 This is how the North American law describes and analyzes it in The People v. 
Phillips, 1 Western Law Journal 109 (1843), reproduced in The Catholic Lawyer, vol. 
I (1955), pp. 199-209: «After carefully examining this subject, we are of opinion that 
such a witness ought not to be compelled to answer. The benevolent and just principles 
of the common law, guard with the most scrupulous circumspection, against 
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Third, this conflict between a secular duty and a religious one highlights 
religious autonomy. Religious autonomy is part of the fundamental right 
to religious freedom. It means the right of the church, confession, or 
religious community to manifest beliefs institutionally, through self-
government (ad intra) and the expression of its own identity (ad extra), 
even against state regulatory requirements. Religious autonomy is, for 
example, the right to select one's leaders, define one's doctrines without 
external intervention, resolve one's disputes or conflicts, and direct one's 
institutions.57 A peculiar form of expression of religious autonomy in 
Spanish law is the so-called religious groups’ «safeguard clauses of 
religious identity and their character» recognized in article 6.1 of the 
Organic Law of Religious Freedom. When secular law exempts one from 
the duty to testify or report the content of communications that fall under 
the religious communications privilege, it generates a special rule that 
gives priority to the characteristics of a phenomenon of a confessional 
legal order (duty not to reveal) concerning the demands that this same 
phenomenon has in the secular law itself (duty to reveal). 
In practice, this special rule may follow two basic patterns. One is the 
«reinforcement» of the secrecy duty, excluding before governmental 
authorities or judges any type of report or testimony made by ministers 
of religion, who become unqualified/incompetent to report or to testify. 
The other comprises a generic rule that guarantees the minister of 
religion the right to abstain from the duty to testify or report; however, if 
 
temptations to perjury, and against a violation of moral feeling; and what greater 
inducement can there be for the perpetration of this offence, than placing a man between 
Scylla and Charybdis, and in such an awful dilemma that he must either violate his oath, 
or proclaim his infamy in the face of the day, and in presence of a scoffing multitude? 
And is there not something due to the feelings of human nature, which revolt with 
horror at an avowal that must exclude the witness from the pale of decent society, and 
subject him to that degradation which is a frequently the cause as the consequences of 
crime? (…) It cannot therefore, for a moment be believed, that the mild and just 
principles of the common Law would place the witness in such a dreadful predicament; 
in such a horrible dilemma, between perjury and false swearing: If he tells the truth he 
violates his ecclesiastical oath — If he prevaricates he violates his judicial oath — 
Whether he lies, or whether he testifies the truth he is wicked, and it is impossible for 
him to act without acting against the laws of rectitude and the light of conscience» (p. 
201-203). This same argument, albeit in a different legal tradition, is followed by J. 
CARBONNIER, Derecho Flexible (transl. L. DÍEZ-PICAZO), Tecnos, Madrid (1974), p. 
27.  
57 W. COLE DURHAM, R. SMITH, “§ 5:1. Defining church autonomy”, Religious 
Organizations and the Law, Westlaw, 2020. 
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the minister of religion reports or testifies, the statement made is valid. 
This model is, in my view, more congruent with state neutrality. 
The two previous models appear both in unilateral state legal rules and 
in concordats or agreements between the state and religious groups. The 
inclusion of clauses of religious communications privilege in concordats 
or agreements plays a double role: prevent possible collisions between 
secular and religious law as a secundum legem solution to eventual 
problems of conscientious objection to apparently neutral laws, and 
satisfying the real legal needs posed by certain religious groups —not 
necessarily all— in terms of religious freedom and autonomy. 
Next, Spanish regulations on the religious communications privilege are 
expounded. 
5. Religious communications privilege in Spanish law 
In Spanish law, the regulation of the religious communications privilege 
results from both bilateral-agreed and unilateral rules. Part of this set of 
rules arose in legal and political circumstances that differ from those set 
out in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. This Constitution imprints on 
previous rules a well-determined orientation. The constitutional articles 
that guide regulations on the religious communications privilege are, 
mainly, article 16 (freedom of religion),58 18 (right to privacy),59 24.2 
(professional and familiar communications privilege),60 53 (special legal 
 
58 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Official Gazette (hereinafter BOE) no. 311, 29 
December 1978. Article 16. 1. Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals 
and communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression than may 
be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law. 2. No one may be compelled 
to make statements regarding his religion, beliefs or ideologies. 3. There shall be no 
State religion. The public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society 
into account and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation with the Catholic 
Church and the other confessions. 
59 Article 18.1. The right to honor, to personal and family privacy and to the own image 
is guaranteed. 2. The home is inviolable. No entry or search may be made without the 
consent of the occupant or a legal warrant, except in cases of flagrante delicto. 3. 
Secrecy of communications is guaranteed, particularly of postal, telegraphic and 
telephonic communications, except in the event of a court order to the contrary. 4. The 
law shall limit the use of data processing in order to guarantee the honor and personal 
and family privacy of citizens and the full exercise of their rights. 
60 Article 24. 2. (…) The law shall determine the cases in which, for reasons of family 
relationship or professional secrecy, it shall not be compulsory to make statements 
regarding alleged criminal offences.  
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protection of fundamental rights),61 and 10.2 (fundamental rights 
interpretive rules).62 
5.1. Bilateral agreed rules on the religious communications privilege 
In 1976, the Spanish government and the Holy See signed an agreement 
whose primary purpose was the settlement of historic disputes about the 
election of bishops and the so-called «privilegio del fuero» (the remnants 
of a clergy jurisdictional privilege). This agreement contains the 
following provision: 
«Article II.3. In no case may clerics and members of religious orders be 
required by judges or other Authorities to give information on persons or 
matters of which they have had knowledge by reason of their ministry».63 
This is a provision for the protection of Catholic religious 
communications, almost identical to that contained in Article XVI of the 
Spanish concordat of 1953.64 The literal wording of the text («In no case 
may clerics and members of religious orders be required») makes it clear 
that it grants an exemption, not a prohibition to testify; this is a pattern 
 
61 Article 53. 1. The rights and liberties recognized in Chapter Two of the present Title 
are binding for all public authorities. The exercise of such rights and liberties, which 
shall be protected in accordance with the provisions of Article 161, 1a), may be 
regulated only by law which shall, in any case, respect their essential content. 2. Any 
citizen may assert his or her claim to the protect the liberties and rights recognized in 
Article 14 and in Section 1 of Chapter Two, by means of a preferential and summary 
procedure in the ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by submitting an individual 
appeal for protection («recurso de amparo») to the Constitutional Court. This latter 
procedure shall be applicable to conscientious objection as recognized in Article 30. 3. 
The substantive legislation, judicial practice and actions of the public authorities shall 
be based on the recognition, respect and protection of the principles recognized in 
Chapter Three. The latter may only be invoked in the ordinary courts in the context of 
the legal provisions by which they are developed.  
62 Article 10. 2. The principles relating to the fundamental rights and liberties 
recognized by the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements thereon 
ratified by Spain. 
63 Instrumento de Ratificación de España al Acuerdo entre la Santa Sede y el Estado 
Español, hecho en la Ciudad del Vaticano el 28 de julio de 1976, BOE núm. 230, de 24 
de septiembre de 1976. 
64 Concordato entre España y la Santa Sede, BOE núm. 292, de 19 de octubre de 1953. 
Artículo XVI.7. Los clérigos y los religiosos podrán ser citados como testigos ante los 
Tribunales del Estado; pero si se tratase de juicios criminales por delitos a los que la 
ley señale penas graves deberá pedirse la licencia del Ordinario del lugar en que se 
instruye el proceso. Sin embargo, en ningún caso podrán ser requeridos, por los 
Magistrados ni por otras Autoridades, a dar informaciones sobre personas o materias 
de las que hayan tenido conocimiento por razón del Sagrado Ministerio. 
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that brings religious communications privilege closer to the legal 
treatment of conscientious objections.65 The protective scope of the 
agreed precept surpasses the seal of confession, which is of course 
protected, to extend to spiritual communications other than the 
sacrament of penance.66 The subjective scope includes both clergy and 
members of religious orders. The definition of these categories of 
individuals must be construed by reference to canonical rules.67 
Regarding the objective scope, the norm intends it to apply not only to 
the legal procedure but also to other fields such as administrative law, 
citizen security protocols, etc. Afterwards, the Agreement on legal affairs 
between the Spanish government and the Holy See, of January 3, 1979, 
did not introduce any new provision regarding the religious 
communications privilege, so it can be considered that Article II.3 of the 
1976 Agreement is the main legal rule in this matter. 
Sixteen years before the enactment of the 1976 Agreement, the religious 
communications privilege returned to the agreed Spanish regulations. 
We will subsequently discuss how. 
According to Article 81.1 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978,68 an 
Organic Law69 developed the fundamental right to religious freedom in 
1980.70 This Organic Law «kept the spirit of consensus that prevailed in 
the political forces during the elaboration of the Constitution and was 
approved by an overwhelming majority of the Congress, indeed almost 
unanimously. This fact was indicative of the acceptance of the new 
constitutional system of church-state relations».71 Article 7 of the 
Organic Law of Religious Freedom provided that the state could enact 
 
65 R. NAVARRO-VALLS; J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Conflictos entre conciencia y ley: las 
objeciones de conciencia, 2. ed., rev. y ampliada, Iustel, Madrid, 2012, pp. 518-519. 
66 J.M. TORNE Y GARCÍA, “La declaración testifical de clérigos y religiosos en el 
proceso penal español”, Revista de Derecho Procesal, I enero-marzo (1967), p. 140. 
67 V. MORENO CATENA, El secreto en la prueba de testigos del proceso penal, 
Montecorvo, Madrid, 1980, p. 256. 
68 Article 81. 1. Organic laws are those relating to the development of fundamental 
rights and public liberties, those which establish Statutes of Autonomy and the general 
electoral system, and other laws provided in the Constitution. 
69 A.-C. ÁLVAREZ-CORTINA; M. RODRÍGUEZ BLANCO (EDS.), La libertad religiosa en 
España: XXV años de vigencia de la ley orgánica 7/1980, de 5 de julio (comentarios a 
su articulado), Editorial Comares, Granada, 2006; M. RODRÍGUEZ BLANCO; M. 
GONZÁLEZ SÁNCHEZ (EDS.), “40o aniversario de la Ley Orgánica de Libertad 
Religiosa”, Derecho y Religión, vol. 25, 2020. 
70 Ley Orgánica 7/1980, de 5 de julio, de Libertad Religiosa, BOE núm. 177, de 24 de 
julio de 1980. 
71 J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, State and Religion in Spain, Nomos, 2020, pp. 374-375. 
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Cooperation Agreements with Churches, Confessions and religious 
Communities registered in the Registry of Religious Entities, if those 
religious groups have had gained, due to their scope and number of 
believers, well-known roots («notorio arraigo») in Spain. Thus, on 
November 10, 1992, the Parliament approved the Cooperation 
Agreements of the Spanish state with the Federation of Evangelical 
Religious Entities of Spain, with the Federation of Jewish Communities 
of Spain, and with the Islamic Commission of Spain.72 These are three 
«mirror agreements» due to their similarities (namely the subjects dealt 
with and the terminology used) and because they follow the path of the 
topics agreed upon long before with the Catholic Church, which at this 
point behaves as a pattern of cooperative legal treatment.73 The three 
agreements included clauses related to the religious communications 
privilege, in articles 3.2 of each of the three laws, as a specific aspect of 
the legal regime of ministers of religion: these individuals will not be 
obliged to testify about facts that have been revealed to them in the 
exercise of functions of worship or religious assistance. 
Strikingly, when dealing with this topic the Agreement with the Islamic 
Commission of Spain follows a different wording from the other two, 
specifying «in the legally established terms for professional secrecy». 
This equation to professional secrecy may distort the specific nature of 
the religious communications privilege or at least distance the regulation 
of one of the agreements from the other two for no well-founded reason. 
Perhaps what is emphasized with this singular addition —«in the legally 
established terms for professional secrecy»— is that the Islamic religious 
secret (and likely the Jewish religious secret as well) is not founded on a 
requirement of a religious-ritual nature, but rather on the right to privacy. 
As to the individual entitled, the Agreements establish a legal concept of 
the minister of religion that adds, to the religious requirement established 
by each group, a formal requirement of accreditation. For this reason, the 
religious communications privilege recognized in the Agreements 
protects ministers of religion who comply with state legal rules (Article 
3.2 refers to 3.1)74, the confessional notion not being sufficient. By 
 
72 Leyes 24, 25 y 26 de 10 de noviembre de 1992, BOE núm. 272, de 12 de noviembre 
de 1992.  
73 P. J. VILADRICH, “Los principios informadores del Derecho eclesiástico español”, in 
Derecho eclesiástico del Estado español, 1a ed., Eunsa, Pamplona, 1980, pp. 292-294. 
74 Ley 26/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el Acuerdo de Cooperación 
del Estado con la Comisión Islámica de España, BOE núm. 272, de 12/11/1992, artículo 
3.1. A los efectos legales, son dirigentes religiosos islámicos e Imanes de las 
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contrast, the 1976 Agreement with the Holy See, as described previously, 
offers a different shape without these additional requirements. 
From the point of view of matters protected by secrecy, the three 
agreements protect confidentiality concerning «facts that have been 
revealed to them in the exercise of functions of worship or religious 
assistance». There is no limitation to a specific context or to a specific 
act of worship, but instead to the type of relationship; it must have a 
religious content accompanied by the expectation of confidentiality. 
The formal scope of protection is loosely defined by the term «declare». 
I do not think that it is an exclusive reference to the witness statement, 
but it could well embrace any manifestation or explanation required by 
the state authorities. 
The bilaterally agreed regulations with the three minority religious 
groups, therefore, protect ministerial secrecy but add dissonant elements, 
such as the requirement of accreditation to protect ministers of religion 
and the assimilation of religious communications to Islamic ministers of 
religion to professional secrecy. 
 
Comunidades Islámicas las personas físicas dedicadas, con carácter estable, a la 
dirección de las Comunidades a que se refiere el artículo 1 del presente Acuerdo, a la 
dirección de la oración, formación y asistencia religiosa islámica y acrediten el 
cumplimiento de estos requisitos mediante certificación expedida por la Comunidad a 
que pertenezcan, con la conformidad de la «Comisión Islámica de España». Ley 
24/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el Acuerdo de Cooperación del 
Estado con la Federación de Entidades Religiosas Evangélicas de España, artículo 3.1. 
A todos los efectos legales, son ministros de culto de las Iglesias pertenecientes a la 
FEREDE las personas físicas que estén dedicadas, con carácter estable, a las funciones 
de culto o asistencia religiosa y acrediten el cumplimiento de estos requisitos, mediante 
certificación expedida por la Iglesia respectiva, con la conformidad de la Comisión 
Permanente de la FEREDE. Ley 25/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el 
Acuerdo de Cooperación del Estado con la Federación de Comunidades Judías de 
España, artículo 3.1. A todos los efectos legales son ministros de culto de las 
Comunidades pertenecientes a la Federación de Comunidades Judías de España las 
personas físicas que, hallándose en posesión de la titulación de Rabino, desempeñen 
sus funciones religiosas con carácter estable y permanente y acrediten el cumplimiento 
de estos requisitos mediante certificación expedida por la Comunidad a que 
pertenezcan, con el visado de la Secretaría General de la FCJE. Esta certificación de la 
FCJE podrá ser incorporada al Registro de Entidades Religiosas. 
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5.2. Internal non-agreed legal rules 
5.2.1. Procedural law 
In expounding procedural regulations, we shall start with the civil 
procedure. According to Article 361 of the Spanish Law of Civil 
Procedure, ministers of religion are not excluded from being suitable 
witnesses.75 Article 371.1 provides that the witness when due to their 
status or profession must keep secrecy regarding the facts on which they 
are questioned will explain this reasonably and the court, considering the 
basis for that refusal to testify, will resolve what is appropriate in law by 
a judicial order. If the witness is released from testifying, this exemption 
will be noted in the record.  
As we can see, Article 371.1 does not mention ministers of religion, 
lawyers, doctors, or journalists;76 any reason of religious or professional 
duty, if assessed and accepted by the court, could release an individual 
from testimony. According to this scheme, religious communications 
privilege is recognized on a case-by-case basis. Such a scheme seems to 
be beneficial in theory for three reasons. First, because it grants the 
exemption only to those who are required to keep secrecy due to 
disciplinary requirements, regulations, etc., of their own community, 
church, or religious group. Second, because it does not add additional 
requirements, such as the registration of the religious group in the 
Registry of Religious Entities,77 the declaration of well-known roots 
(«notorio arraigo») in Spain,78 or the pre-existence of a cooperation 
agreement. And third, unlike the regulation of religious communications 
privilege included in the cooperation agreements of 1992, the Civil 
Procedure Law system does not condition the exemption to other 
 
75 Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil, BOE núm. 7, de 08/01/2000, 
Artículo 361. Idoneidad para ser testigos. Podrán ser testigos todas las personas, salvo 
las que se hallen permanentemente privadas de razón o del uso de sentidos respecto de 
hechos sobre los que únicamente quepa tener conocimiento por dichos sentidos. Los 
menores de catorce años podrán declarar como testigos si, a juicio del tribunal, poseen 
el discernimiento necesario para conocer y para declarar verazmente. 
76 Artículo 371. Testigos con deber de guardar secreto. 1. Cuando, por su estado o 
profesión, el testigo tenga el deber de guardar secreto respecto de hechos por los que se 
le interrogue, lo manifestará razonadamente y el tribunal, considerando el fundamento 
de la negativa a declarar, resolverá, mediante providencia, lo que proceda en Derecho. 
Si el testigo quedare liberado de responder, se hará constar así en el acta. 
77 Real Decreto 594/2015, de 3 de julio, por el que se regula el Registro de Entidades 
Religiosas, BOE núm. 183, de 1 de agosto de 2015. 
78 Real Decreto 593/2015, de 3 de julio, por el que se regula la declaración de notorio 
arraigo de las confesiones religiosas en España, BOE núm. 183, de 1 de agosto de 2015. 
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requisites than those alleged to the judge or the court. However, it is no 
less true that this generic procedural law exemption system could lend 
itself to restrictive interpretations, either due to ignorance of the religious 
requirements or because public interest (namely compulsory testimony 
to acquire truth) could always be considered more important than the 
value of the privilege. This interpretation might not be improbable in 
secularized countries such as Spain since, as noted at the beginning, 
utilitarian reasoning immediately finds more weight to reveal the truth in 
court than to respect confessional rules that might seem regressive and 
obscurantist. 
Article 262 of Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure regulates the 
reporting duty of any individual when aware of any criminal conduct.79 
Article 263 provides an exemption from that duty «to dissident 
ecclesiastics and ministers of religion regarding the news that has been 
revealed to them in the exercise of the functions of their ministry».80 
Besides, Article 417 of the same law regulates the protection of ministers 
of religion in testimony, establishing an exemption without imposing a 
duty of silence.81 The wording «dissident ministers of religion» deserves 
attention, «dissidents» should be interpreted —integrating it with article 
11 of the Spanish Constitution of 1876— as belonging to religions other 
than Catholic, but not just Christian religions.82 In the current regime, 
the extension of protection can be considered absolute, and even more 
 
79 Real Decreto de 14 de septiembre de 1882 por el que se aprueba la Ley de 
Enjuiciamiento Criminal, BOE núm. 260, de 17/09/1882, Artículo 262. Los que por 
razón de sus cargos, profesiones u oficios tuvieren noticia de algún delito público, 
estarán obligados a denunciarlo inmediatamente al Ministerio fiscal, al Tribunal 
competente, al Juez de instrucción y, en su defecto, al municipal o al funcionario de 
policía más próximo al sitio si se tratare de un delito flagrante. Los que no cumpliesen 
esta obligación incurrirán en la multa señalada en el artículo 259, que se impondrá 
disciplinariamente. 
80 Artículo 263. La obligación impuesta en el párrafo primero del art. anterior no 
comprenderá a los Abogados ni a los Procuradores respecto de las instrucciones o 
explicaciones que recibieren de sus clientes. Tampoco comprenderá a los eclesiásticos 
y ministros de cultos disidentes respecto de las noticias que se les hubieren revelado en 
el ejercicio de las funciones de su ministerio. 
81 Artículo 417. No podrán ser obligados a declarar como testigos: 1.º Los eclesiásticos 
y ministros de los cultos disidentes, sobre los hechos que les fueren revelados en el 
ejercicio de las funciones de su ministerio. 2.º Los funcionarios públicos, tanto civiles 
como militares, de cualquiera clase que sean, cuando no pudieren declarar sin violar el 
secreto que por razón de sus cargos estuviesen obligados a guardar, o cuando, 
procediendo en virtud de obediencia debida, no fueren autorizados por su superior 
jerárquico para prestar declaración que se les pida. 3.º Los incapacitados física o 
moralmente. 
82 V. MORENO CATENA, El secreto en la prueba de testigos del proceso penal, p. 258. 
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advantageous than that of the 1992 agreements previously explained. 
Paradoxically, the conjunction of bilateral and unilateral norms does not 
offer a unified concept of the minister of religion regarding the sources 
of definition: the concept of the minister of worship for Catholic clergy 
is determined by canon law; the concept for religious groups that enjoy 
the Agreements of Cooperation of 1992 is determined by the state based 
on that of each confession and group, and the concept of the minister of 
religion for religious groups without agreement does not have a specific 
legal definition, it leads to the appreciation of the criminal court or judges 
according to what each minister of religion is able to explain. This lack 
of a unified concept of a minister of religion is not the consequence of 
an explicit or implicit intention of the state to discriminate against 
minority religious groups, nor does it reveal the Catholic Church's subtle 
intention to achieve a privileged status, but instead is simply due to the 
lack of coordination and coherence between the different rules. 
This lack of coordination and coherence could perhaps be solved in the 
next Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure, now a draft of the Ministry of 
Justice. However, the draft bill exhibits several problems. 
Article 661 of the Draft Bill establishes that «[t]he ministers of religions 
recognized by the state may not be compelled to testify relating facts that 
have been entrusted to them in the exercise of the functions of their 
ministry for which they must keep secret». Religious communications 
privilege is envisaged in the draft bill as a subtype of professional secrecy 
because it is regulated in the same article as the privilege of lawyers, 
attorneys, doctors or health personnel, and translators or interpreters, and 
because the article is labeled with the introductory clause «Exemptions 
from the duty to testify due to professional secrecy».83  
Regarding the exemption to the duty to testify, the aforementioned article 
adds an interesting final clause: «Except for lawyers and solicitors, all 
 
83 Artículo 661. Exenciones a la obligación de declarar por razón de secreto profesional. 
1. No podrán ser obligados a prestar testimonio: (…) 4.º. Los ministros de confesiones 
religiosas reconocidas por el Estado, sobre los hechos que les hayan sido confiados en 
el ejercicio de las funciones de su ministerio por las que deban guardar secreto. (…) 
Salvo los abogados y procuradores, todas las personas mencionadas estarán obligadas 
a prestar declaración cuando el titular del secreto les releve del deber de guardarlo. 







individuals mentioned will be obliged to give a statement when the 
holder of the secret relieves them of the duty to keep it». This clause 
places the Catholic priest in a difficult situation since canon law —as the 
Apostolic Penitentiary pointed out and has been recalled previously— 
does not exempt the priest from the duty of secrecy at the penitent’s 
request. Hence, the text of the draft bill is in open contradiction with the 
fundamental right of religious freedom by subordinating the exemption 
to the will of the faithful or penitent, the holder of the secret. This serious 
injury is further increased since the exemption from the duty to report84 
regulated in the draft bill we are examining here is devised following the 
wording of this exemption from the duty to testify.85 
The military procedural law in article 135 exempts from the duty to 
report «ministers of religion concerning facts or liable individuals from 
which they know because of the exercise of their ministry».86 For the 
exemption from the duty to testify, this law refers to the Law of Criminal 
Procedure. 87 
 
84 Anteproyecto de Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal (versión para información pública). 
Artículo 526. Obligación de denunciar. 1. Cualquier persona que haya presenciado la 
comisión de un delito perseguible de oficio deberá denunciarlo de inmediato ante la 
policía o ante el Ministerio Fiscal. 2. También están obligados a denunciar quienes por 
razón de su cargo, profesión u oficio tengan noticia de la perpetración de algún delito, 
aunque no lo hayan presenciado.  
85 Artículo 527. Exenciones a la obligación de denunciar. El deber de denunciar no 
comprenderá: (…) b) A quienes, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en esta ley, estén exentos 
del deber de declarar por razón de secreto profesional respecto de los hechos de que se 
trate.  
86 Ley Orgánica 2/1989, de 13 de abril, Procesal Militar, BOE núm. 92, de 18 de abril 
de 1989. Artículo 135. La obligación establecida en el artículo anterior no alcanzará: 
1.º Al cónyuge del presunto culpable o persona ligada a éste por relación estable de 
convivencia afectiva. 2.º A los ascendientes, descendientes y colaterales hasta el 
segundo grado, inclusive, de consaguinidad o afinidad, salvo cuando haya obligación 
de dar parte militar. 3.º A los abogados y procuradores, respecto de las explicaciones o 
instrucciones que recibieran de sus clientes, aun en el caso de que no llegaran a 
encargarse de su representación o defensa. 4.º Al defensor militar, una vez nombrado 
respecto a su defendido. 5.º A los ministros de cultos religiosos, respecto de los hechos 
o a las personas responsables de que tuvieren conocimiento en razón del ejercicio de su 
ministerio. 
87 Artículo 170. Están exentos de la obligación de declarar el Rey, la Reina, sus 
respectivos consortes, el Príncipe de Asturias y los Regentes del Reino. También están 
exentos del deber de declarar los Agentes diplomáticos acreditados en España, en todo 
caso, y el personal administrativo, técnico o de servicio de las misiones diplomáticas, 
así como sus familiares, si concurren en ellos los requisitos exigidos en los tratados, y 
todas las demás personas a las que la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal declara 
dispensadas o exentas de prestar declaración. 
29 
 
5.2.2. Criminal law and prison law 
In the opinion of experts, the conduct of revealing secrets by the minister 
of religion is not included in paragraph 1 of Article 199 of the Spanish 
Penal Code: 88 «Whoever reveals the secrets of others, of which he knows 
because of his trade or labor relations, will be punished with a prison 
sentence of one to three years and a fine of six to twelve months». The 
reason for this opinion is that «an interpretation that extends the concept 
of professional to these categories of individuals is not possible».89 
Article 197 of the same code penalizes the disclosure of confidential 
communications made by a third party who intercepts the conversation 
between the minister of religion and the faithful, introducing 
aggravations of the penalty when specific circumstances concur, such as 
the profit aim or the content of the conversation disclosed (personal data 
that reveals ideology, religion, beliefs, health, racial origin or sexual 
life). 90 
Spanish legislation regulates the communications of persons deprived of 
liberty in prisons, including the communications of ministers of religion 
 
88 Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal, BOE núm. 281, de 24 
de noviembre de 1995. 
89 R. GARCÍA ALBERO, “Comentario al artículo 199 del Código Penal”, in Comentarios 
al Código Penal (Tomo II), Aranzadi, 2008, BIB 2008\4062, 3.4. Problemática 
particular de los eclesiásticos y ministros de cultos. 
90 Artículo 197. 1. El que, para descubrir los secretos o vulnerar la intimidad de otro, 
sin su consentimiento, se apodere de sus papeles, cartas, mensajes de correo electrónico 
o cualesquiera otros documentos o efectos personales, intercepte sus 
telecomunicaciones o utilice artificios técnicos de escucha, transmisión, grabación o 
reproducción del sonido o de la imagen, o de cualquier otra señal de comunicación, será 
castigado con las penas de prisión de uno a cuatro años y multa de doce a veinticuatro 
meses. (…) 5. Igualmente, cuando los hechos descritos en los apartados anteriores 
afecten a datos de carácter personal que revelen la ideología, religión, creencias, salud, 
origen racial o vida sexual, o la víctima fuere un menor de edad o una persona con 
discapacidad necesitada de especial protección, se impondrán las penas previstas en su 
mitad superior. 6. Si los hechos se realizan con fines lucrativos, se impondrán las penas 
respectivamente previstas en los apartados 1 al 4 de este artículo en su mitad superior. 
Si además afectan a datos de los mencionados en el apartado anterior, la pena a imponer 
será la de prisión de cuatro a siete años. 
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with inmates. 91 The law provides that these communications are subject 
to rules of intervention.92 
In a rare decision on the religious communications privilege, the Spanish 
Supreme Court ruled in a case concerning stolen jewels that, after the 
sacramental penance of the thief, were delivered to the confessor.93 The 
appellant, in that case the thief, requested the testimony of the parish 
priest, but the priest did not appear, weakening —in the appellant's 
opinion— the chance of the spontaneous regret legal assessment. The 
Supreme Court held: «The rejection [of the appeal] is imposed by virtue 
of the following reasons: a) because article 707 in relation to 417.1º, both 
of the Criminal Procedure Law, establishes that they cannot be 
compelled to testify the priests 'on the facts that are revealed to them in 
the exercise of the functions of their ministry', and although the accused 
admitted his intervention 'on the occasion of other judicial proceedings', 
this would not exempt the Catholic priest from the duty of secrecy 
without the express authorization of the penitent, which cannot be 
presumed; b) that the confession of the facts in the sacrament of penance 
is not relevant for the purposes and effects of the lessening of punishment 
due to spontaneous repentance that must have expression in the 
confession before the Authorities in charge of the investigation and 
punishment of the crimes [...]» Therefore, the court maintained the non-
existence of an implicit waiver and, at the same time, pointed out that the 
legal protection of religious communications does not depend on the 
private or public knowledge of the confessed crime. 
 
91 Ley Orgánica 1/1979, de 26 de septiembre, General Penitenciaria, BOE núm. 239, 
de 5 de octubre de 1979. Artículo 51.3. En los mismos departamentos podrán ser 
autorizados los internos a comunicar con profesionales acreditados en lo relacionado 
con su actividad, con los asistentes sociales y con sacerdotes o ministros de su religión, 
cuya presencia haya sido reclamada previamente. Estas comunicaciones podrán ser 
intervenidas en la forma que se establezca reglamentariamente.  
92 Real Decreto 190/1996, de 9 de febrero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento 
Penitenciario, BOE núm. 40, de 15 de febrero de 1996, Artículo 49.5. Los Notarios, 
Médicos, Ministros de Culto y otros profesionales acreditados, cuya presencia haya 
sido solicitada por algún interno por conducto de la Dirección del Establecimiento para 
la realización de las funciones propias de su respectiva profesión, podrán ser 
autorizados para comunicar con aquél en local apropiado.  




6. Concluding remarks 
To date, religious communications privilege in Spanish law has been a 
sound and protected rule. Its historical roots lie in the seal of the Catholic 
sacrament of penance, from which it has undergone a process of 
secularization until its merger with so-called professional secrets. 
However, such a merger does not do justice either to the foundation of 
the different secrets or to the legal interests and fundamental rights at 
stake. Under current Spanish regulations, religious communications 
privilege has two sources of legal protection: agreed bilateral rules and 
unilateral or non-agreed rules. Regarding the bilaterally agreed rules, the 
Agreement of Cooperation with the Islamic Commission of Spain is 
particularly striking; it seems to equate the religious communications 
privilege to professional secrecy in general. In projecting this issue to the 
future, the regulation of the religious communications privilege in the 
would-be Law of Criminal Procedure (now a draft bill) is more 
disconcerting —not to say harmful to the fundamental right of religious 
freedom. In light of this draft bill, it seems to me that it is consistent to 
conclude with the same idea with which this study began: in a secularized 
context, the seal of confession in particular and the religious 
communications privilege in general are subjected to a utilitarian or 
consequentialist debate in which the justification of a hypothetical 
socially valued good will always have more weight than the 
unconditional protection of an institution that, because of its unknown 
character, could be easily harmed. 
